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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008/9 crystallized a “new normal” in the global economic 
discourse.  The vulnerability of national economies to global instability, and its implications for 
individual livelihoods, became clear to citizens and governments of developed countries as they 
struggled to cope with the biggest recession since the Great Depression.  However, this new 
normal for developed countries is in fact the old normal for developing countries, where national 
and individual level vulnerability to shocks has been an ever present reality.  
 
As developing countries have integrated into the global economy, along with the 
enormous opportunities has come an intensification of risks of different types.  These include the 
collapse of particular industries in a constantly shifting global market, spread of infectious 
diseases through greater mobility, and of course global financial crises.  Added to these are 
climatic risks which have clearly worsened over the last decades, and to which countries 
dependent on agriculture are particularly susceptible. 
 
Agriculture reminds us that even without intensification of risks at the global level, the 
poorest of the poor have always been vulnerable to weather shocks and lead a precarious 
existence where luck plays a great role in determining even survival.  Going beyond weather 
shocks, individual level shocks such as poor health or accidents at work are a constant threat to 
the wellbeing of poor households, shocks which can set off a spiral of ever increasing 
indebtedness from which escape is near impossible.  Financial traps are only one dimension of 
the spiral.  
 
A key dimension of insecurity, especially for the poorest households, is food and 
nutrition insecurity.  The threat can be a direct one where agricultural shocks threaten households 
which grow their own food for consumption, or more generally it can be indirect where loss of 
income due to a range of negative shocks threatens the capacity to purchase an adequate amount 
of food and nutrition in the market place.  Added to the short term downturn is the fact that poor 
nutritional intake during lean times can lead to worsening health and, especially for children, 
with long term developmental consequences.  
 
With this background, it is surprising indeed how little attention was paid to vulnerability 
and protection from risks, in the discussion surrounding the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) of 2000.  Certainly it was not introduced as an explicit goal among the list of the eight 
goals or even as a target or indicator.  It could be argued that it was present implicitly in the first 
goal of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger.  Among targets and indicators under this goal 
were halving (i) the proportion of population in “dollar a day” poverty, (ii) prevalence of 
underweight children under five years of age and (iii) proportion of population below minimum 
level of dietary energy consumption.  While these indicators are suggestive, they do not directly 
address the issue of risk and vulnerability.  Of course vulnerability is more difficult to track than 
levels, which leads to the added complication that outcomes which are not measured are often 
underappreciated in the policy context. 
 
The global community is currently discussing the “post-2015” agenda, in terms of goals 
and targets to succeed the MDGs.  The Open Working Group (OWG) for Sustainable 
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Development Goals (SDGS) has presented a proposal to the UN General Assembly1; there is to 
be a year of discussion and negotiation before final adoption at the 2015 UN General Assembly. 
While these are early days, it does seem as though risk and vulnerability, and building resilience 
towards risk and vulnerability, are more present in this proposal for SDGs than they were in the 
MDGs. 
 
Given this enhanced interest in vulnerability and social protection, this chapter considers 
the topic with a focus on concrete targets and policy actions needed to meet these targets.  First, 
it highlights why exactly vulnerability and social protection are back on the agenda.  It then 
discusses some possible targets for social protection based on global patterns of spending and 
their effectiveness.  Next it addresses the challenges faced by policy interventions to meet targets 
for social protection.  The chapter ends with a summary of the main policy conclusions. 
 
 
2. Vulnerability and its Consequences 
 There is growing evidence that national level vulnerability has increased due to economic 
and non-economic factors.  On the economic front, global integration has brought with it 
opportunities for economic growth, but also greater economic volatility in this growth.  Thus 
some researchers found a strong association between greater trade openness and aggregate 
volatility, with the effect much more pronounced for developing countries.2 
 
The economic risks have been compounded by greater climate volatility.  Thus the latest 
IPCC assessment concludes with “very high confidence” that “Impacts from recent climate-
related extremes, such as heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires, reveal significant 
vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystems and many human systems to current climate 
variability.”3  The spread of infectious diseases in a world of greater labor mobility has added 
further to national level risks, as shown by the experience of the spread of Ebola in Liberia and 
its neighbors. 
 
These risks at the national level have consequences at the individual level through their 
impact on the economy, agriculture and health4.  National level shocks have gained attention in 
recent years, but they are merely additions to the risks that the poor have always faced at the 
individual level of poor harvests due to climate or pests, and of a variety of health and 
employment shocks.  Together, the macro and the micro level vulnerabilities can have a 
significant impact on short term poverty and medium term development. 
 
                                                 
1 “Introduction to the Proposal of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals.” 
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4518SDGs_FINAL_Proposal%20of%20OWG_19%20July
%20at%201320hrsver3.pdf Accessed October 14, 2014.  
2 J. di Gioviani and A. Levchenko. “Trade Openness and Volatility," .Review of Economics and Statistics, 91:3 
(August 2009), 558-585. 
3IPCC. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability—Summary for Policy Makers. 
http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf  Accessed October 14, 2014.  
4 See for example, IFPRI assessments of climate change impacts on African agriculture at 
http://www.ifpri.org/book-775/ourwork/researcharea/climate-change. 
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At the most basic level, sharp negative downturns in income, food intake or nutrition 
increase measured poverty, hunger and malnutrition.  The greater the risk of downturn, the 
higher will be the probability of falling below critical thresholds in income, food or nutrition. 
Panel data, where household wellbeing is tracked over time, can reveal these patterns. In 
Vietnam, for example, while 30% of households moved out of poverty between 1993 and 1998, 
another 5% moved into poverty.5 
 
If negative effects of short term shocks in the downward direction could be fully 
compensated by the positive effects of shocks in shocks in the positive direction, then risk would 
be less of a worry.  Unfortunately, however, this is not the case.  Researchers have shown that 
the damage that is done in the downturn is not made up in the upturn, and this is especially true 
in the case of shortfalls in food and nutrition.6  
 
What is equally important, furthermore, is that while household actions to cope with 
shocks are not adequate to fully compensate, those actions which are taken can be detrimental to 
medium term development.  A debt trap is built up, and households stick to low return but less 
risky crops and investments.  For example, a study in Pakistan found that “high incidence and 
cost of shocks borne by households, with health and other idiosyncratic shocks dominating in 
frequency, costliness, and adversity.  Sample households lack effective coping options and use 
mostly self-insurance and informal credit.  Many shocks result in food insecurity, informal debts, 
child and bonded labor, and recovery is slow.”  Of course both private and public safety nets 
play a role but are inadequate.7  
 
Thus, just as macro level volatility affects economic growth negatively, micro level 
vulnerability leads to negative short and medium term effects for the poorest.  Since existing and 
informal mechanisms are inadequate (otherwise we would not have the issue in the first place), 
and since these vulnerabilities are unlikely to decrease in the near future, “social protection” 
interventions have a clear role in addressing these risks and vulnerabilities.  A range of studies 
have shown that safety nets provided by social protection can contribute to economic growth. 8 
 
  
                                                 
5 Chronic Poverty Research Centre. Chronic Poverty Report, 2008-09, 2009. 
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/CPR2_ReportFull.pdf, Accessed, October 14, 2014. 
6 Alderman, H., J. Hoddinott, and W. Kinsey. 2006. “Long-Term Consequences of Early Childhood Malnutrition.” 
Oxford Economic Papers 58 (3): 450–474. 
Baird, S., J. Friedman, and N. Schady. 2011. “Aggregate Income Shocks and Infant Mortality in the Developing 
World.” Review of Economics and Statistics 93 (3): 847–856. 
Carter, M., and T. Lybbert. 2012. “Consumption versus Asset Smoothing: Testing the Implications of Poverty Trap 
Theory in Burkina Faso.” Journal of Development Economics 99 (2): 255–264. 
7 Heltburg, Rasmus and Niels Lund. 2009. Shocks, Coping and Outcomes for Pakistan’s Poor: Health Risks 
Predominate.” Journal of Development Studies, Volume 45, Issue 6, pp. 864-888. 
8 For a recent review see Alderman, H., and R. Yemtosv,” How Can Safety Nets Contribute to Economic Growth?” 
World bank Policy Research Paper, Number 6437, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/ 
WDSP/IB/2013/05/07/000158349_20130507154500/Rendered/PDF/wps6437.pdf Accessed October 14, 2014. 
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3. Social Protection and Poverty 
With high vulnerability to shocks which can drive poor households deeper into poverty, 
hunger and undernutrition, and the inadequacy of current informal mechanisms to address these 
insecurities, the question arises whether such security can be provided socially by state 
interventions.  Such social protection could address the short term consequences of negative 
shocks to agriculture, employment or health, and in doing so also help to address the medium 
term impacts on productivity and income growth. 
 
Social protection is broadly understood to encompass a range of public programs which 
provided insurance and transfers in cash or in kind. Sometimes the term “social security” is used 
interchangeably with “social protection”.9  Different programs are included in different sources 
of information, making comparability difficult. However, most definitions include social 
insurance (contributory programs, principally pensions or unemployment benefit) and non-
contributory social assistance programs (or social safety nets) which include programs such as 
cash transfers, food stamps, school feeding, in-kind transfers, labor-intensive public works, 
targeted food assistance, subsidies and fee waivers.  Thus alongside insurance, social protection 
as commonly discussed also encompasses redistributive programs targeted to the poor and 
vulnerable.  Indeed, as a practical matter it is difficult to separate out these two roles of social 
protection.10 
 
The extent of social protection in the world is difficult to pin down because of 
definitional and data issues.  One estimate suggests that between 0.75 billion and 1.0 billion 
people in low- and middle-income countries are recipients of some form of cash support. But the 
coverage of social protection is not comprehensive.  As the World Social Protection Report 
2014/15 notes, “Only 27 percent of the global population enjoy access to comprehensive social 
security systems, whereas 73 percent are covered partially or not at all” (p. xxi).11 Another 
estimate, using the World Bank’s ASPIRE data set and definitions, is  that for developing and 
transition economies less than a half of the population has access to social protection programs, 
with the number being less than one third in South Asia and less than one quarter in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.12 
 
 Limited though they are, what is the poverty impact of social protection transfer 
programs in developing countries?  Focusing on income poverty because of the availability of 
data on a comparable cross-country basis, one way to answer this question is to subtract the 
monetary value of social protection benefits and recalculate poverty on this basis.  Of course this 
                                                 
9 For a definition of “social security” from the perspective of the International Labor Organization, see footnote 1 on 
p. 2 of the World Social Protection Report 2014/15, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_245201.pdf Accessed October 14, 2014 
10 Kanbur, Ravi. 2010. “Conceptualising Social Security and Income Redistribution,” Bulletin Luxembourgeois des 
questions sociales, Volume 27, pp. 31-41, 2010.  
11 ILO. World Social Protection Report 2014/15: Building Economic Recovery, Inclusive Development and Social 
Justice. ILO: Geneva. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/ publication/ 
wcms_245201.pdf,  Accessed October 14, 2014 
12 Fiszbein, Ariel, Ravi Kanbur and Ruslan Yemtsov. 2014. “Social Protection and Poverty Reduction: Global 
Patterns and Some Targets.”  World Development, Vol. 61, pp 167-177. 
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will be an overestimate to the extent that individual responses or other community mechanisms 
step in to fill the gap.  However, to the extent that social protection improves medium term 
income prospects through better handling of risk, this would be an underestimate.  With these 
caveats in mind, and making assumptions to extrapolate from the ASPIRE data set to the global 
population, it has been estimated that estimate that around 150 million people are prevented from 
falling below the $1.25 poverty line worldwide as result of social protection programs that do 
exist.  Focusing on the sum of the gaps between income/consumption and the poverty line, they 
estimate that social protection programs eliminate almost half of the total poverty gap. The 
impact on numbers and on gap is however weakest in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is not 
surprising given the low coverage of population noted above.13 
 
 What determines the impact of social protection transfers on poverty?  Focusing on the 
total poverty gap, intuitively there are two components to the impact.  First is the total budget for 
social protection transfers relative to the pre-social protection poverty gap.  Second is what 
fraction of the total budget actually goes to the poor to fill the poverty gap.  These are the twin 
determinants of the efficacy of social protection transfers in addressing poverty—budgetary 
adequacy, and targeting efficiency.  ASPIRE data show that average targeting efficiency for the 
countries in the sample is 8%.  This is very low, but compares to the best value of 40% and an 
average value for the top quartile of countries of 21%. 
 
 Clearly, improving targeting efficiency will increase the poverty reduction impact of 
social protection transfers.  Suppose that we were to set as a goal for social protection that it 
halve the poverty gap.  Suppose further that we were to set as an ambitious goal for targeting 
efficiency for every country, the very top targeting efficiency in the world (40%).  It has been 
shown that improving targeting efficiency is not enough to attain the poverty reduction goal. 
Only 73% of all countries in the sample would achieve the goal of halving the poverty gap.  For 
low income countries, only half of the countries would achieve the target even with the very best 
targeting efficiency seen in the world.  In other words, the problem is as much one of budgetary 
adequacy as it is one of targeting efficiency.  The total budget as a fraction of the poverty gap 
does not exceed 20% in low income countries in the sample, clearly insufficient to address 
poverty no matter how well it is targeted.14 
 
 The above calculations are for the impact of social protection on income poverty.  Some 
aspect of the insurance role of social protection is also captured in these calculations to the extent 
that insurance prevents negative shocks from driving households into poverty.  However, the 
insurance role can also have beneficial long term effects which is not captured directly in the 
short term impact calculations.15 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Fiszbein, Ariel, Ravi Kanbur and Ruslan Yemtsov. 2014. “Social Protection and Poverty Reduction:  Global 
Patterns and Some Targets.”  World Development, Vol. 61, pp. 167-177. 
14 Fiszbein, Ariel, Ravi Kanbur and Ruslan Yemtsov. 2014. “Social Protection and Poverty Reduction:  Global 
Patterns and Some Targets.”  World Development, Vol. 61, pp. 167-177. 
15 Alderman Harold and Trina Haque.  Countercyclical Safety Nets for the Poor and Vulnerable.  Food Policy 34(4) 
pp. 372-383. 2006. 
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4. Challenges of Social Protection 
 Adequate budgets are a major challenge of social protection programs, but the design of 
social protection poses challenges going beyond budgetary adequacy.  Targeting of benefits to 
the poor is of course a challenge. Fine targeting to the poor and only the poor is easier said than 
done.  There are at least two issues that fine targeting raises.  First is the informational and 
administrative challenge of identifying the poor and separating them from the non-poor to 
receive the transfer.  Recent improvements in information technology like biometric 
identification or electronic banking could help to address this problem.16  Second is the political 
economy challenge of finding a support program which only benefits the poorest—one reason 
why less well targeted programs are prevalent is because they enjoy the support of middle 
income groups as well. 
 
 Even beyond targeting, social protection raises a further set of design challenges.17  The 
first of these is the interaction between formal social protection programs and preexisting family, 
community and informal mechanisms of insurance and transfers.  A challenge for the design of 
state supported social protection is how they will respond.  If they decline, then the net effect of 
state intervention is less than the gross effect and this has to be taken into account in evaluation 
of the success or otherwise of social protection. 
 
 The second challenge is conceptual with political implications.  Is social protection 
insurance or is it redistribution?  Insurance has greater support than redistribution, especially 
among middle and upper income groups, but it is very difficult in practice to separate out one 
from the other.18  Thus, for example, a progressive tax system, or a cash transfer scheme to the 
poor financed from the general fiscal revenue, is redistributive but it also provides insurance 
through lower taxes or even transfers when incomes are low as it is financed by higher taxes 
when income are high.  By the same token, programs that are labeled as social insurance but 
actuarially require transfers from the fiscal budget are redistributive without this being 
appreciated.  Any pension schemes for public sector workers are of this type—they redistribute 
towards the beneficiary group on average.  The estimation of the insurance versus the 
redistribution component of such schemes represents an analytical challenge. 
 
 A third challenge in the discourse on social protection is that of conditional cash 
transfers19.  There are two parts to the challenge—payment in cash and conditioning of the 
                                                 
16 Biometric innovations like India’s Aadhar program are still being rolled out and need to be evaluated. For a range 
of issues in identification, see Casey Dunning, Alan Gelb and Sneha Raghavan, “Birth Registration, Legal Identity 
and the Post-2015 Agenda,” Center for Global Development,  Policy Paper 046,  
http://international.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/birth-registration-legal-identity.pdf , Accessed October 14, 2014. 
17 For a detailed discussion see Kanbur, Ravi. 2014.  “Social Protection: Consensus and Challenges,” in G.A. Cornia 
and Frances Stewart (eds.) Towards Human Development: New Approaches to Macroeconomics and Inequality, 
Oxford University Press, pp. 86-98. 
18 Kanbur, Ravi. “Conceptualising Social Security and Income Redistribution,” Bulletin Luxembourgeois des 
questions sociales, Volume 27, pp. 31-41, 2010.  
19  Fiszbein, Ariel and Norbert Schady. (2009): Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty. 
World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington DC: World Bank. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCCT/Resources/5757608-1234228266004/PRR-CCT_web_noembargo.pdf  
Accessed October 14, 2014. 
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transfer.  There is a vigorous debate between those who favor transfers in cash versus those who 
favor transfers in kind.  Transfers in cash are argued to be administratively easier with recent 
advances in mobile banking and electronic transfers, not requiring the government to manage 
vast food stocks, for example.  They are also argued to be economically efficient, since they 
allow the individual to make the choice of what the cash is spent on.  However, the counter 
argument is that payment in kind makes it more likely that the benefits will flow to the 
household and to vulnerable members of the household.  The jury is still out on this debate and 
preliminary research results by IFPRI scholars suggest that the relative effectiveness of different 
modalities may depend heavily on contextual factors such as the severity of food insecurity and 
the thickness of markets for grains and other foods.20  
 
On conditioning of the transfer, there is some evidence that conditioning works, in the 
sense that the  variable which is being conditioned on, for example keeping children in school, 
usually improves with the conditional cash transfer.  But conditioning is not useful everywhere; 
it can also discriminate against households who need support but cannot meet the conditions, and 
adds administrative and monitoring burdens.21  However, despite its problems, conditioning is 
can also be part of the political bargain which buys the support of the middle classes and the 
decision making authorities.  This is related to a fourth challenge, that of sustainability. Finance 
ministers, in particular, are concerned about what might become an open ended commitment to 
transfers without an “exit”.  Conditioning on human capital accumulation could aid this exit for 
individuals and households. 
 
A fifth challenge in the social protection discourse, the final one discussed here, is 
developing social protection in low income countries (LICs).  Although not easy to establish 
quantitatively, not least because of the difficulties of cross-country comparability in what comes 
under the umbrella of social protection, there seems to be a consensus that social protection 
programs are more widespread in middle income countries (MICs).  We have already noted that 
coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa is much lower than in the world as a whole and the budgetary 
allocations to social protection are much lower in LICs.  Another indirect indicator is that taking 
World Bank lending as a whole, 13% of World Bank projects in MICs were devoted to social 
safety nets, while the figure for LICs was 6%.22 
 
 The challenge lies in the argument that this is the “natural” order of things: in fact, LICs 
cannot “afford” social protection, and that countries have to first grow and then develop social 
protection.  The counterargument is that it is precisely in these countries that the need for social 
protection is greatest, and that without social protection negative shocks can trap the poor into a 
                                                 
20 See http://www.ifpri.org/blog/cash-food-or-vouchers and related papers: John Hoddinott and Amy Margolis. 
“Costing Alternative Transfer Mechanisms”. IFPRI Discussion paper 1375 (sept 2014); Hidrobo, Melissa, John 
Hoddinott, Amber Peterman, Amy Margolies, and V. Moreira. 2014. “Cash, Food, or Vouchers? Evidence from a 
Randomized Experiment in Northern Ecuador.” Journal of Development Economics 107: 144–156.  And Hoddinott, 
John, Susanna Sandstrom and Joanna Upton.   “The Impact of Cash and Food Transfers:  Evidence from a 
Randomized Intervention in Niger”.  IFPRI Discussion Paper #1341. April 2014. 
21 Adato, M. & L. Bassett, 2012. Social protection and cash transfers to strengthen families affected by HIV and 
AIDS, Research Monograph, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
22  Independent Evaluation Group. 2011. Social Safety Nets: An Evaluation of World Bank Support, 2000-2010. 
http://ieg.worldbank.org/Data/reports/chapters/ssn_full_evaluation.pdf Accessed, October 14, 2014. 
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cycle of poverty and their countries into a path of low growth.  There is also further evidence that 
social protection interventions do not fare any worse in LICs than in MICs.  The World Bank’s 
Independent Evaluation Group finds that in terms of the performance of social safety net projects 
LICs did no worse—in fact, using its well-established evaluation scale, 88% of projects scored 
“Moderately Satisfactory” or better in LICs, while the number was 85% for MICs. 23 
 
 
5. Policy Conclusion 
Social protection was largely missing from the MDG discourse, which was shaped in the 
1990s.  The experience of the last two decades has emphasized the importance of social 
protection especially in the face of growing economic and non-economic risks both at the 
individual and at the national levels which exacerbate poverty, hunger and undernutrition.  The 
United Nations Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals has proposed 17 goals 
and a more detailed set of targets under each goal, and the first three goals encompass social 
protection explicitly:24 
  
 Under Goal 1, “End poverty in all its forms everywhere,” there are the conventional 
targets on percentage of population in extreme poverty.  But there is also the target 
1.3 to “implement nationally social protection systems and measures for all, including 
floors, and by 2030 achieve coverage of the poor and vulnerable.” 
 
 Under Goal 2, “End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and 
promote sustainable agriculture,” target 2.1 states “by 2030 end hunger and ensure 
access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations 
including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round.” 
 
 Under Goal 3, “Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages,” target  
3.8 states:  “achieve universal health coverage (UHC), including financial risk 
protection, access to quality essential health care services, and access to safe, 
effective, quality, and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.”  
 
Most countries have some programs which can be classified as falling under social 
protection.  Social protection programs can have a significant impact on reducing poverty.  But 
there is inadequate coverage of the population, especially in low income countries.  It goes 
without saying that better targeting of a given budget will enhance the poverty reduction of 
social protection.  However, for many countries, especially low income countries, the problem is 
one of adequacy of budgetary resources.  Beyond targeting and budgetary resources, social 
protection programs also face a series of design challenges which need to be addressed, and they 
need to be seen as a system rather than as individual programs. 
 
                                                 
23 . Independent Evaluation Group. 2011. Social Safety Nets: An Evaluation of World Bank Support, 2000-2010. 
http://ieg.worldbank.org/Data/reports/chapters/ssn_full_evaluation.pdf Accessed, October 14, 2014. 
24  “Introduction to the Proposal of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals.” 
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4518SDGs_FINAL_Proposal%20of%20OWG_19%20July
%20at%201320hrsver3.pdf Accessed October 14, 2014. 
11 
 
The first step for countries and for the international community should be to institute a 
Social Protection Assessment Program (SPAP) for each country, led by the country’s 
government with support from development partners.  Analogously to the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) of the IMF and the World Bank, such an assessment would look at 
the social protection programs as a collectivity and provide an assessment of the system as a 
whole not only as a poverty reduction device, but as a safety net, through “stress testing” with 
respect to a range of micro level risks and macro level crises.  For example, the assessment 
would ask the question whether the system as a whole can provide support in the face of a 
drought, or of an external economic crisis which affected the local economy.  Based on such an 
analysis, the assessment would identify gaps and recommend additions, subtractions, and 
improvements to the design of individual programs and the system as a whole. 
 
Such an assessment would in turn lead to a specific program of investments to strengthen 
the system to deal with a range of individual level shortfalls and risks, and national level shocks. 
Most of the resources for these improvements will have to come from the outside in the first 
instance especially for low income countries.  However, as important as external resources for 
reforming and building up the collectivity of programs as a system is the rapid response to the 
financing needed when national level shocks hit a country.  For this, a global facility is 
appropriate.  A number of instruments are currently available, such as the “deferred drawdown 
option” in IBRD loans which disburse when certain triggers are breached which confirm that a 
crisis is at hand. For low income countries IDA has a Crisis Response Window but more is 
needed to develop the facility further and to stream line it to provide an automatic response when 
a crisis is identified.25 
 
Thus social protection broadly construed, encompassing elements of both insurance and 
targeted transfers to the poorest and most vulnerable, is now recognized as a cornerstone of 
development policy.  This is especially true given the greater degrees of economic and non-
economic risks faced by developing countries and their populations in the wake of global 
integration and climate change.  National governments supported by the international community 
need to design efficient programs as a system and to provide adequate finance for social 
protection.  
                                                 
25 The proposal for SPAP and a global facility for maintaining social protection at times of crisis is made in Kanbur, 
Ravi. 2012. "Stress Testing for the Poverty Impacts of the Next Crisis" Ambar Narayan and Carolina Sánchez-
Páramo (eds.). Knowing, When You Do Not Know, Washington DC: The World Bank, pp. 50-55. 
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